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Since the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the 
establishment of a harmonised international carbon 
market has been seen as one of the main strategies 
in international climate policy. So far, however, the 
market is far from being globally harmonised or sys-
tematically linked. Instead, a mosaic of national and 
sub-national markets has been under development, 
differing in timing, location, relationship to the Proto-
col and their levels of legal commitment.
Nevertheless, creating a global carbon market is a key 
goal of EU climate policy. As plans for the establish-
ment of emissions trading systems (ETS) emerge in 
various non-Annex I countries, prospects for linking 
them to existing systems seem to finally get in reach.
We have analysed the prospects of emission trading in 
non-Annex I countries in a recent paper on behalf of 
the German environment ministry.1 In the following we 
first give a theoretical overview of what design factors 
need to be taken into account when establishing na-
tional emission trading systems. The following elabo-
rates on the status of emissions trading discussion in 
various non-Annex I countries.
Design issues in linking domestic emission trad-
ing schemes
Links among ETS of every type of country will have to 
deal with seven basic issues: coverage of the scheme, 
definition and recognition of trading units, type and 
stringency of emission targets, allocation methodol-
ogy, temporal flexibility, MRV, and compliance systems. 
The need for harmonisation varies with regard to these 
design elements. Some design options such as the 
systems’ coverage may raise equity issues and stir op-
position from concerned stakeholders. However, they 
are unlikely to adversely affect the overall effectiveness 
of the linked regimes. A constellation where one or 
more gases or categories of sources are included in one 
scheme but not in the other first and foremost raises 
questions regarding competitiveness and gaining the 
necessary political support for linking under these cir-
cumstances. However, competitive disadvantages and 
possible discrimination due to diverging treatment of 
sectors in two trading regimes are not caused by link-
ing and would also occur in its absence. 
Other aspects have important implications for the 
equity, the economic and the environmental effec-
tiveness in a combined scheme. The definition and 
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gency of the targets, the provisions for banking and 
borrowing, monitoring, reporting and verification and 
the compliance regime fall into this category. It bears 
noting that all of these issues fundamentally depend 
upon countries’ levels of ambition as regards climate 
protection. If environmental effectiveness is the main 
priority, the route leads clearly to stringent absolute 
targets with reliable MRV and strict penalties. Such a 
system will also be careful to allow only high-quality 
offsets to count towards compliance. By contrast, 
features such as relative targets, weak emission caps, 
price caps or safety valves and a generous recognition 
of offsets sacrifice environmental effectiveness for the 
sake of containing costs. Through linking, these cost-
containment measures will also impact all other linked 
systems. Linking should therefore only be sought be-
tween countries which have a comparably ambitious 
climate policy outlook.
Linking developed and developing country schemes 
raises another fundamental issue: Since developing 
countries do not dispose of Kyoto-valid trading units, 
new mechanisms or policy options need to be devel-
oped if trading units from developing countries are to 
be used by industrialised countries.
Emerging systems in Non-Annex I countries
The following is limited to countries where a minimum 
of specific information on emission trading discussions 
was available. These are Brazil, China, India, Kazakhstan, 
Mexico, and South Korea. Tentative discussions are also 
taking place in other countries such as those that have 
received grants under the Partnership for Market Read-
iness. However, these appear to be at an even more 
general level than the discussions in the countries that 
are covered here. 
Brazil has established a stock exchange for voluntary 
carbon units which may precede a domestic trading 
scheme. In addition, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil’s second rich-
est state, recently announced to launch an ETS for its 
largest emitters between 2013 and 2015. Rio de Janeiro 
is also in consultation with its neighbour states. 
China has made concrete steps towards the creation of 
regional ETS in various cities and provinces. Newer an-
nouncements even envisage the creation of a national 
system by 2015. However, these plans are still in early 
stages, and differ widely in their institutional designs. 
For example, whereas Guangdong is likely to put in 
place a trading system based on absolute emission 
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caps, Tianjin and Beijing have indicated that their trad-
ing schemes might be based on energy saving credits.
 
India has not shown much propensity for a domestic 
ETS due both to political and institutional reasons. 
However, trading schemes for energy efficiency and 
renewable energy are already in place. Kazakhstan has 
very definite plans for an ETS, and has in fact a draft 
law in parliament. 
Mexico has been one of the earliest proponents of a 
domestic ETS, but has not taken this plan much farther. 
Under the World Bank’s Partnership for Market Readi-
ness, Mexico has been one of the first eight countries 
to receive an initial grant of USD 350,000 in order to 
build up domestic capacities for the implementation 
of carbon markets. However, if Mexico’s Expression 
of Interest for the Partnership is any indication, focus 
seems to have shifted from a domestic ETS to the 
development of credited NAMAs in energy efficiency 
in housing, appliances and other end uses, methane 
destruction or use in solid waste disposal, improved 
cement blended production, and urban transport. 
Mexico envisages that part of the financing for these 
NAMAs may come from crediting, but the ideas revolve 
around improving national regulation or establishing 
local projects rather than introducing a domestic ETS.
South Korea has already come very far in the design of 
its ETS. However, due to opposition by domestic in-
dustry, targets have been weakened and the start date 
pushed back. There are currently two competing bills 
in Parliament. In the interim, a Greenhouse Gas & En-
ergy Target Management System is to ensure that the 
pledged emissions reduction of 30% below business 
as usual by 2020 will be met. Even though government 
officials coined it a precursor to the ETS to come, it is 
at the moment not a real trading system. Instead, the 
nationally-set target is broken down to company level 
and individual targets for the country’s 470 largest 
emitters will be imposed. As with the planned ETS, the 
system covers more than 60% of the nation’s emissions. 
If individual targets are not met, the failing company 
will first be issued an improvement order. If targets 
are overshot for a second time, a fixed fee of 100 mil-
lion won (ca. € 6,300) will have to be paid, even if the 
company is only marginally off-target. Means of com-
pliance include voluntary energy-saving agreements 
with the Ministry of Knowledge Economy as well as 
Korean certified (KCERs) emissions reductions, issued 
by the same ministry. Issuance of KCERs and validation 
of agreed reductions depend on cuts in the companies’ 
own facilities and may not be traded at this point in 
time. Emissions cuts bought abroad (e.g. CERs) are also 
specifically excluded from the scheme.
Conclusions and Outlook
The above survey has shown that the outlook differs 
substantially from country to country. Kazakhstan and 
South Korea are the most advanced, specific emission 
trading bills have been put on the table in these coun-
tries. However, even here not all design elements are 
clear and it is uncertain when these laws might actually 
be passed. China’s new-found commitment to the crea-
tion of a nation-wide scheme by 2015 gives reason for 
optimism. However, the implementation pathway is as 
yet unclear. The question is in particular how the very 
diverse design choices of the envisaged pilot schemes 
are to be aligned to form a convergent system on such 
short notice. 
The trading systems that do emerge may not neces-
sarily be based on GHG emissions. India is establishing 
trading systems for energy efficiency and renewable 
energy and some Chinese provinces are also consider-
ing efficiency-based systems. On the one hand, such 
systems might optimistically be seen as potential 
precursors to a GHG trading system that help to build 
capacity and gain first experiences with trading. On the 
other hand, institutional lock-in and path dependen-
cies might prevent a later shift from energy consump-
tion to GHG trading.
In addition, even where GHG emissions trading is pur-
sued, such a system will not necessarily be compatible 
with the global carbon market. The environmental 
benefits of emissions trading and those of linking with 
other schemes crucially depend on the design of a 
trading system. This relates especially to the nature 
and stringency of the targets and the inclusion of cost-
containment features. Through linking, such features 
would impact the whole combined trading scheme 
and thus impair rather than enhance its environmental 
effectiveness. 
Finally, there is the sheer complexity of establishing an 
ETS. Even in the EU, where implementation of an ETS 
was fast-tracked as much as possible, the process from 
the publication of the Commission’s Green Paper on 
emissions trading to the start of the system took five 
years.
Nevertheless, as Chinese announcements are becom-
ing increasingly ambitious, the creation of a large-
scale Chinese system by the middle of this decade is a 
distinct prospect. There is also clear interest in various 
other developing countries to explore the possibilities 
of introducing emissions trading systems. Taken to-
gether with the developments in Australia and Califor-
nia, 2015 might see a very substantial share of global 
emissions being covered by domestic emission trading 
systems. 
Incidentally, 2015 has just been set to be the end date 
of the new negotiation process launched in Durban. 
The endgame of the Durban Platform might hence play 
out in the context of a very substantial share of global 
emissions being covered by domestic emission trading 
systems, which should constitute a rather favourable 
environment for agreeing to a global framework.
